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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine under what conditions it makes sense to say that we are capable of 
perceiving actions performed by other agents as intentional and, thus, of identifying the intentions governing 
these actions.  
Whether it makes sense to say that intentions can be perceived rather then inferred depends in part on what 
notion of intention one has in mind. The first step in the paper will therefore involve specifying the notion of 
intention at stake. Two rather different conceptions of intentions and intentional action should be distinguished: 
one stresses their relation to reasons, the other their executive dimension. On the former view, to say that 
someone acts intentionally or with an intention is simply to say that she acts for reasons, i.e., that some 
appropriate relation obtains between the agent's beliefs and desires and her actions. The latter view stresses the 
executive dimension of intentions, their role as plans or representations that guide and control the action. On 
this latter view, an action is intentional if it is caused by representations that guide and control its unfolding. It 
is also important to stress that, on both views, intentions can form hierarchies: there may be hierarchies of 
reasons for a given action or it may be that intentions considered as elements of an action plan are themselves 
hierarchically organized. 
I will concentrate on the 'executive' conception of intentions and intentional actions. I will argue that 
intentional bodily movements have distinctive observable characteristics that set them apart from non-
intentional bodily motions. I will also argue that that when we observe an action performed by someone else, 
the perceptual representations we form contain information about the dynamics of movements and their 
relations to objects in the scene that can be exploited in order to identify at least the more basic intentions of 
the agent. In the final part of the paper, I will offer some suggestions as to how this capacity to perceive the 
actions of other agents as intentional relates to our capacity to recognize our own actions as intentional.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine under what conditions it makes sense to say that we 
can perceive actions performed by other agents as intentional and, thus, in a sense, can 
perceive intentions. What I propose is therefore a limited foray in the philosophical 
minefield known as the Problem of Other Minds. It is limited in the sense that I will be 
concerned only with intentions to the exclusion of other kinds of mental states and that 
furthermore I will be concerned with intentions understood in a specific way. It is also 
limited in the sense that although at the end of the paper I will risk a few remarks on what is 
called the semantic problem of other minds, I will mostly concentrate on the epistemic 
problem of other minds. I will proceed as follows. I will start with some stage setting and a 
brief sketch of how the problem of other minds in its common formulation stems from a 
Cartesian picture of the mind. I will then concentrate on intentions and specify the notion of 
intention I have in mind. Having done that, I will present evidence for the claim that we can 
perceive intentions in the sense previously defined. In the final part of the paper, I will offer 
some tentative remarks on how our capacity to perceive the intentions of other agents may 
relate to our capacity for knowing our own intentions and on how this might bear on the 
semantic problem of other minds.  
2. Intentions and the problem of other minds 
It is commonly held that there is a fundamental asymmetry between the way we know of our 
own mental states and the way we may come to know the mental states of others. One 
traditional way of construing this asymmetry is as follows. Knowledge of one's own mental 
states is said to be both non-observational and non-inferential, whereas knowledge of the 
mental states of others is thought to be based on observation together with inference. These 
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 supposed differences give rise to two skeptical worries. First, we may worry how the 
meaning of our mental terms and concepts could ever be univocal if the criteria we appeal to 
when applying these terms and concepts to ourselves are radically different from the criteria 
we use when applying them to others. In other words, if it is constitutive of a mental concept 
or of the meaning of a mental term that they have certain criteria of application, then it may 
be doubted whether the relation between first-person concepts of mental states and third-
person concepts of mental states is anything more than one of mere homonymy. This is what 
may be called the semantic problem of other minds. Second, we have an epistemic problem. 
Here, the worry concerns the very possibility of knowledge of other minds, hence whether 
our claims to knowledge can ever be justified. If our access to the mental states of others is 
inferentially mediated, if the process through which we make mental attributions to others is 
one of theoretical inference from an observation of behavior to an attribution of a mental 
state thought to be its causal antecedent, then it seems in principle possible that the theory 
upon which the inferences are based is incorrect and therefore that any given attribution of a 
mental state to others could be false.  
As a number of philosophers have remarked1, this way of conceiving of the problem of other 
minds is a consequence of a Cartesian picture of the mind and its relation to bodily behavior. 
According to this picture, the mind is an inner realm and mental states are internal states 
whose intrinsic mental character is independent of anything external including the subject's 
body and its behavior. Conversely, human bodies are conceived as merely material objects 
and their behavior as being intrinsically non-intentional. What confers intentional properties 
to behavior are its inner mental accompaniments and causes. In other words, nothing 
intrinsic distinguishes a mere bodily happening from a piece of intentional behavior; the 
difference is one of causal antecedents and since internal mental causes can't be directly 
                                                 
1 See, for instance Child, 1994.  
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 observed they must be inferred, thus leaving open the possibility that the inference be 
incorrect.  
Of course, the Cartesian picture of the mind is not the only game in town. One possible 
alternative, outlined by McDowell2, is that the concept of a 'human being' should be viewed 
as basic, 'as a seamless whole of whose unity we ought not to have allowed ourselves to lose 
sight in the first place' (McDowell, 1982: 470). One consequence of this view is that 
behavior and mentality are much more integrated than the Cartesian picture suggests and 
that, in favorable circumstances at least, the fact that someone else is in some mental state 
can itself be an object of one's experience, that is be available to awareness in its own right 
and not merely through behavioral proxies.  
My purpose here is to offer a limited defense of this alternative approach, one restricted to 
intentions. The claim I want to defend is that intentions can be, at least in some 
circumstances, transparent in behavior, that they can be directly observed and don't have to 
be inferred on the basis of behavioral proxies. Let me label this claim the transparency 
thesis. Note that my referring to McDowell in relation to this position should not be taken to 
imply that my defense of the transparency thesis will go along the same lines as his defense 
of it. Indeed, I will have very little to say about the space of reasons. My approach will be 
much more down to earth. I will focus rather on the close links between perception and 
action and will present some empirical evidence that intentions can be perceived. 
3. An executive conception of intentions 
One further thing I must do before laying out my defense of the Transparency Thesis is 
make it clear what notion of 'intention' I will be working with. As remarked by Velleman 
(1989), in the theory of action literature one finds two rather different conceptions of 
                                                 
2 Note that according to McDowell this was also Wittgenstein's view. The idea that the notion of a 'human 
being' or a 'person' should be taken as primitive is also present in Strawson (1959). 
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 intentions and intentional action: one stresses their relation to reasons, the other their 
executive dimension. On the former view, to say that someone acts intentionally or with an 
intention is simply to say that she acts for reasons, i.e., that some appropriate relation obtains 
between the agent's beliefs and desires and her actions. Here, an intention is the reason or 
motivation one has for acting in a certain way. The latter view stresses the executive 
dimension of intentions, their role as plans or representations that guide and control the 
action. On this latter view, an action is intentional if it is caused by representations that 
guide and control its unfolding. It is also important to stress that, on both views, intentions 
can form hierarchies: there may be hierarchies of reasons for a given action or it may be that 
intentions considered as elements of an action plan are themselves hierarchically organized. 
One way to contrast the two approaches is to say that although both appeal to the notion of a 
goal, the former one is essentially interested in how this goal finds its inscription in the 
space of reasons, in how it relates to beliefs and desires, whereas the latter is interested in 
how the goal shapes and controls behavior, how it relates to know-how. The former 
approach is thus essentially backward-looking, whereas the latter is forward-looking. This 
difference of emphasis has consequences for which actions will be considered intentional. 
Take, for instance, the following example adapted from Mele (1994). Tom, who has never 
handled a gun before but is offered a large prize for hitting the bull's-eye on a distant target, 
aims carefully, fires and hits the bull's-eye. Does he do it intentionally? Here, proponents of 
the backward-looking view might answer positively. Tom's action was intentional insofar as 
his action was done for a reason — Tom wanted the prize money and thought that to win it 
he had to hit the bull's-eye — and thus he acted with the intention to hit the bull's-eye. On 
the other hand, advocates of the forward-looking approach would probably deny that the 
action is intentional, insisting that hitting the bull's eye is not sufficiently within the control 
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 of the agent because he lacks sufficient skill and because there is therefore an important 
element of luck involved in the action resulting in success or failure.  
The notion of intention I am going to focus on is the one privileged by the forward-looking 
approach, i.e. intentions considered as plan-states rather then as reasons or motivations. 
More precisely I will be interested in the ultimate, most basic elements in plans. Plans 
involve both orienting beliefs, beliefs about the circumstances one is in, and instrumental 
beliefs, i.e., beliefs concerning means and preliminary steps. These instrumental beliefs may 
be said to incorporate knowledge as to how to bring about a certain desired result. However, 
as Israel, Perry and Tutiya (1993) have argued, when the agent's orienting instrumental 
beliefs are correct, what ultimately accounts for the success or failure of an intended action 
are the bodily movements performed. Thus, a full explanation of action must incorporate 
more than just orienting and instrumental beliefs. What must ultimately be accounted for are 
the bodily movements performed by the agent. These authors suggest that in order to 
account for these movements, we must introduce the notion of a belief-how. A belief-how 
concerns the relations between movements and action. It is a belief that performing a 
movement of a certain kind in certain circumstances is a way of bringing about a certain 
result (hence of performing a certain action) in those circumstances. Moreover, for an agent 
to have such a belief-how, not just any idea of the type of movement in question will do, the 
agent must have an executable idea of it. That is, he must know or think he knows how to 
perform movements of this type. Beliefs-how are thus the ultimate elements in a hierarchical 
plan for action.  
What I want to further suggest is that in order to be in a position to account for the specific 
conditions of success of an action, we need to appeal to very detailed executable 
representations of goal-oriented bodily movements. But then it becomes implausible to ask 
that these representations should be fully specified before the onset of action, for requiring 
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 that an agent form a very detailed representation of the movement before its execution 
threatens to impose on him an excessive cognitive burden, especially if the movement is 
somewhat complex. However, nothing forces to assume that all the representational work 
has to be done and be over with before the execution starts. Representations do not just 
trigger the action; they also guide and control it until its completion. One way to account for 
the specific conditions of success of a given action, while avoiding the problem of cognitive 
overload, is to consider that the representations that guide and control the movement are not 
fully specified before its onset but are dynamical and relational and serve to adjust the 
movement to the changing context in which it unfolds. As another way to put it, the degree 
of specification of the bodily movements depends on the degree of specification of the 
circumstances. It is implausible to suppose that an agent represents the circumstances in all 
their fine-grained detail in advance of the action. Very specific and transitory circumstances 
don't have to be represented in advance of action because they will be represented as the 
need arises in the motor representations that will guide the action. My suggestion is that the 
variable circumstances that have to be represented for an action to be executed divide into 
macro-circumstances, represented in advance of action and into micro-circumstances that 
are represented as the action proceeds through a dynamical sensorimotor loop.  
My general point here is that if we take seriously an executive approach to intentions, one 
that leads us to deny that an action is intentional if the agent doesn't have a reliable plan or 
sufficient skill, then an intention shouldn't be conceived as a purely mental antecedent of the 
action, as a trigger whose work is over once execution starts. To use some of Searle's 
terminology, for some piece of behavior to quality as intentional it is not enough that it be 
caused by a prior intention, rather the intention should ultimately get deployed in the action 
itself as an actualization of motor know-how.  
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 My further point is that if we look more closely at what motor know-how consists in, then it 
becomes apparent that intentional behavior bears its status on its sleeve. I can't even begin to 
give a systematic discussion of the fast growing empirical literature on motor 
representations3, but I will mention some general characteristics of these representations. 
Motor representations involve rapid sensorimotor transformations. They code 
simultaneously for situation, goal and means. The situation is coded in terms of a goal it 
affords and the goal itself is coded in terms of the means — i.e. the bodily movements —
towards its achievement. Three related characteristics of motor representations are worth 
stressing. First, perception for action yields representations with a specific content. 
Attributes of objects and situations are represented in a specific, pragmatic mode used for 
the selection of appropriate patterns of action. Or, to use a philosophical terminology 
introduced by John Campbell (1994), they are represented in a causally indexical way, in 
terms of their immediate implications for action. The visual scene is therefore pragmatically 
organized in terms of the dynamics of a goal-directed behavior. Thus, for instance, if one 
wants to pick up an object, its location will be represented in terms of the kinds of 
movements necessary for reaching it and its shape and size in terms of the kind of grip they 
afford. Second, the representations of the movements to be effected also reflect an implicit 
knowledge of the biomechanical constraints and kinematic rules the body is subjected to. 
Third, motor representation normally code for transitive movements, where the goal of the 
action determines the organization of the whole movement as well as the perceived 
organization of the scene around the agent. Usually, a situation offers not just one but 
several possibilities for actions and can in principle be pragmatically organized in many 
different ways. The presence of a goal has the effect of making one such organization more 
salient than the others. Thus, for instance, the movements of the arm in reaching for grasping 
                                                 
3 See Jeannerod (1997, 1999) for an overview and synthesis of recent work in the cognitive neuroscience of 
action. 
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 and in reaching for hitting have different kinematic patterns (Marteniuk et al., 1987) or, to 
take a different example, the type of grip chosen for grasping an object is made according to 
the subsequent use of the object so that awkward or uncomfortable hand positions are 
avoided and the time spent in extreme joint angles is minimized (Rosenbaum et al., 1990; 
Rosenbaum and Jorgensen, 1992).  
Intentional bodily movements therefore have very distinctive properties, they are 
simultaneously constrained by the agent's goal, by the attributes of the situation and by a set 
of kinematic and biomechanical rules that jointly shape its dynamics. In other words, the 
relational properties of an intentional bodily movement are not purely extrinsic to it, they are 
so to speak internalized and reflected in its organization. Intentional bodily behavior 
therefore has observable characteristics that set it apart from the non-intentional behavior of 
material objects, including passive bodily movements. Its kinematics is distinctive and its 
dynamics is contingent on both the goal of the agent and the features of the situation. 
What I will now argue is that it is the distinctiveness of intentional behavior that makes it 
possible to claim that we can perceive intentional action as such and hence in a sense 
perceive intentions. More precisely, the claim will be that the motor know-how that 
ultimately allows us to act intentionally is also the know-how that allows us to perceive 
intentions in the actions of other agents.  
There remains however an important obstacle to the idea that intentions are perceptible as 
such. Resistance to this idea can be traced back to an implicit (or explicit) acceptance of 
what Susan Hurley (1998) has called the Classical Sandwich Model, the view that 
perception and action are separate and peripheral, one an input system the other an output 
system, whereas cognition is central and separate from processing of perception and action.4 
On this view, perception and action systems are conceived as separate modules, each with 
                                                 
4 See also Brewer (1993) for a critique of this classical model. 
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 their proprietary codes and processing rules. The principles according to which visual 
coding and motor coding group token visual patterns and motor response patterns 
respectively into types are completely different. Their respective classifications, dimensions 
of similarity and variations are thus disparate and the links between them arbitrary. One 
consequence of this view is that the extraction of the significance of visual patterns for 
action requires a complex translation between different types of contents. A further 
consequence is that when we are visually presented with an action performed by some other 
agent, the way this visual pattern will be typed by our perceptual system will bear no direct 
relation to the motor type the seen behavior is a token of. Thus, adherence to the Classical 
Sandwich Model implies that intentions cannot be directly perceived.  
What we have said about the kind of visual processing involved in motor preparation shows 
that this model cannot be fully correct. The existence of what is called pragmatic processing 
of visual information suggests that the motor significance of visual input can be directly 
extracted and the visual scene organized in terms of the patterns of motor activity it affords. 
However, even if one acknowledges the existence of visual pragmatic processing, there is 
one possible line of retreat that retains enough of the Classical Sandwich Model to maintain 
the conclusion that intentions are not perceptible. This consists in conceiving vision for 
action and vision for identification and semantic purposes as two separate modules using 
altogether different ways of coding visual information, with the former system activated 
only when an agent intends to act and the latter the default mode of visual processing. If this 
were the case, the significance of a visual pattern for one's own action could be directly 
extracted, but it could be maintained that in the absence of an intention to act on the part of a 
subject, perceptual information about the behavior of other agents would be processed by 
her semantic system, yielding a different coding of visual information, allowing for no 
immediate reading of the intentional character of the observed behavior. As we will now see, 
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 there are good empirical reasons, however, to claim that this compromise view cannot be 
correct and that vision for action is not restricted to vision for one's own actions. 
4. Evidence for the perception of intentions 
Evidence from psychological, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies indicates that 
the same kind of sensorimotor processing that takes place when one prepares for action also 
takes place when one is observing actions performed by others. Let me here briefly mention 
some of this evidence. Perception of biological motion has been extensively studied by 
psychologists using the point-light technique developed by Johansson (1973), where an 
actor is filmed in a dark room with lights attached to his main joints and where as a 
consequence only kinematic information is available to the perceiver. Johansson's (1973) 
pioneering studies showed that filmed movement patterns of walking, cycling, climbing, and 
dancing by the point-light stimulus agents were not identified when lights were stationary 
but were quickly and reliably recognized as soon as the lights were moving. Using the same 
experimental paradigm, other investigators further demonstrated that subjects were able to 
identify friends by their gait (Cutting and Koslowsky, 1977) as well as the gender of 
walking person (Koslowsky and Cutting, 1977) and that people can recognize themselves 
more easily than others (Beardsworth and Buckner, 1981). Furthermore, perceptual 
sensitivity to human motion seems to be innate or to develop very early. Bertenthal, Proffit 
and Cutting (1984) have shown that infants aged between 3 and 5 months are capable of 
distinguishing upright presentations of dynamic point-light stimuli of a person walking from 
upside-down presentations of the same stimuli as well as of discriminating coherent 
arrangements of light-points from incoherent or scrambled ones. These results suggest that 
visual perception of actions is influenced by implicit knowledge of the motor rules involved 
in their production. Other studies have also shown that this knowledge can be exploited by 
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 the visual system not just for the recognition of action, but also for the recognition of 
intentions. Thus, in a series of experiments using the point-light technique, Runeson and 
Frykholm (1983) have investigated the perception of intentions in object-oriented actions. 
For instance, when an agent has to lift a box, her expectations regarding the weight of the 
box lead her to make specific anticipatory postural adjustments; when the weight is not as 
expected postural readjustments take place. These investigators have shown that subjects 
observing point-like displays of such actions are able to determine what the actor expects the 
weight to be and whether her expectations are correct. Furthermore, they are able to detect 
attempts at deception. If an actor pretends, say, that a suitcase he is carrying is heavier than 
it actually is, his movements will have a non-natural kinematics that can be detected by 
observers. Another series of experiments (Orliaguet et al., 1997; Kandel et al., 2000) 
investigated motor anticipation in the perception of handwriting gestures. For instance, when 
writing an l, the kinematics of the graphic production is influenced by anticipation of the 
next letter to be written and will differ according to whether the l is to be followed by 
another l, an i or a n. It was shown that the visual system can exploit these differences to 
predict the second letter.  
Neuropsychological studies of apraxia also give evidence of the involvement of motor 
knowledge in the perception of action. Neuropsychological data from patients suffering from 
ideomototor apraxia show that these patients can be impaired not just in the execution of 
action but also in the recognition of actions either mimed or actually executed by other 
agents, while showing no deficit in the visual recognition of objects (Heilman et al., 1982; 
Rothi et al., 1985). 
Finally, recent neuroimaging studies have yielded two sets of important results. In the last 
decade, a large body of neuroimaging experiments have investigated the neural networks 
engaged during action generation, action simulation and perception of actions performed by 
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 others agents5. Their findings reveal the existence of an important overlap in the cerebral 
areas activated in these three types of conditions (in particular, the SMA, the dorsal 
premotor cortex, the supramarginal gyrus and the superior parietal lobe). These results have 
been interpreted as supporting the idea that there exists a form of functional and structural 
equivalence among execution, simulation, and observation of actions, all sharing the same 
system of motor representations. Finally, some recent neuroimaging studies (Grafton et al., 
1997, Grèzes and Decety, 2002) have explored the existence of an automatic link between 
the visual perception of an object and the detection of the actions it affords. Cerebral 
activation was compared during the perception of visually presented objects with different 
tasks (judgment of the vertical orientation, motor imagery, silent generation of the name or 
of the corresponding action verb). The set of cortical regions involved in all these conditions 
provides strong evidence that the perception of objects automatically potentiates components 
of the actions they afford, even in the absence of an intention to act. 
All these empirical results converge to undermine even the watered-down version of the 
Classical Sandwich Model that concedes that a special vision for action system is activated 
when one intends to act, but maintains that when one observes someone else acting there is 
not direct commensurability between the perceptual categories used for coding the visual 
input and the motor categories necessary to identify intentional behavior as such. When one 
sees someone else acting, one has visual information both about the kinematics of the agent's 
bodily movements and about the affordances for action that the scene and its objects present. 
We have empirical evidence that both kinds of information are automatically processed 
during perception. Even in cases where a situation affords more than one possible action, 
information about the kinematics of the agent's bodily movements will make it clear which 
action is intended. There is, therefore, no reason to maintain that intentional actions cannot 
                                                 
5 For a review and a meta-analysis of these results, see Grèzes and Decety (2001). 
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 be directly perceived. Contra the Cartesian Picture then, intentional bodily behavior is not 
intrinsically indistinguishable from non-intentional bodily behavior. It has distinctive 
observable properties, a distinctive kinematics and a dynamics that bears systematic 
relations to features of the situation in a way that non-intentional behavior does not. Contra 
the Classical Sandwich Model, perceptual and motor categories are not heterogeneous 
categories bearing only arbitrary relations to one another. Perception and action are closely 
integrated and when we visually perceive actions, we seem to be immediately sensitive to 
the distinctive properties of intentional behavior.  
These data undermine one form of skepticism about knowledge of other minds, skepticism 
that stems from the idea that this knowledge can only be inferential. The need for inferential 
mediation is taken to be the consequence of the existence of a gap. In the Cartesian Picture, 
the gap is an ontological as well as a logical gap between mental states and physical 
behavior. If physical behavior has an intentional character, it is only in virtue of its inner 
causes, and since only the behavior can be observed, inference is needed to go beyond the 
observable in search of its mental causes. A proponent of the Classical Sandwich Model, on 
the other hand, need not accept the Cartesian Picture and can indeed agree that intentional 
behavior has distinctive intrinsic characteristics. Nevertheless, the Classical Sandwich 
Model posits a gap between perceptual and motor categories. These are thought to be only 
arbitrarily related and therefore a theory is needed to effect the complex translation between 
the two codes. What I have tried to argue so far is that in the case of intentions and 
intentional behavior at least, neither the existence of a physical-mental gap, nor the existence 
of a perceptual-motor gap should be accepted. As a result, we have no reason to maintain 
that intentions are undetectable by direct experience and must be inferred on the basis of 
behavior.  
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 5. First-person vs. third-person knowledge of intentions 
However, as I mentioned earlier, the supposedly inferential character of knowledge of other 
minds is not the only potential source of skepticism. According to the Cartesian Picture, the 
asymmetry between first-person and third-person mental knowledge is twofold. Knowledge 
of the mental states of others is inferential whereas knowledge of one's own mental states is 
not and, furthermore, knowledge of others is based on observation whereas self-knowledge 
is based on introspection. This second difference is thought to give rise not just to an 
epistemic problem but also to a semantic problem. How could our mental terms and 
concepts ever be univocal if the criteria we appeal to when applying these terms and 
concepts to ourselves are radically different from the criteria we use when applying them to 
others? In particular, how can these concepts ever be applied to others if they get their 
meaning from our relating them to our first-person subjective experiences?  
I obviously can't go now into a detailed discussion of this further issue, but let me offer as a 
conclusion some tentative thoughts regarding this asymmetry. Once more, I will focus 
exclusively on intentions considered as plan-states. I will not contest the existence of some 
form of asymmetry between first-person access and third-person access, but I will offer 
some reasons to think that the asymmetry may not be as profound as philosophers in the grip 
of the Cartesian Picture have taken it to be. I have argued that when we observe other agents 
acting we can perceive at least their immediate intentions. Even if observing the behavior of 
others give us perceptual access to their intentions, it seems that typically we don't need to 
observe ourselves acting to know what our intentions are — although there may be 
exceptions as when we are engaged in automatic or routine behavior. But how true is that? 
The claim may perhaps be sustained if what we have in mind are intentions considered as 
mere motivational states, as reasons for acting. But the notion of intention I have been 
concentrating on is more demanding. According to this more demanding notion, for one to 
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 be attributed a genuine intention to A and thus to be said to A intentionally when A-ing, it is 
not enough that one be motivated to A, one must also have a reliable plan for A-ing and this 
in turn implies that one must know how to perform the elementary actions that are the 
ultimate constituents of the plan. Thus, genuine intentions require know-how and knowledge 
that we have a genuine intention rather than a mere seeming-intention requires knowledge 
that we have the appropriate know-how. But it seems quite implausible to claim that 
knowledge about know-how could be purely introspective knowledge. Originally at least, it 
is through our interactions with the world around us that we become aware of what we can 
and cannot do. Even if we are endowed with an innate motor repertoire and thus know how 
to do certain things without having to learn how to do them, we may not become aware of 
these capacities before we exert them. This does not mean that to know that we can do 
something we must actually have done it. If the story I have been telling about vision for 
action is true, it may be enough that we are capable of perceiving the world as pragmatically 
organized in a certain way, as affording certain actions. In other words, our awareness that 
we know how to act in a certain way may initially be a form of perceptual awareness. Our 
awareness that we can do certain things and our awareness of the world as pragmatically 
organized in a certain way are but the two sides of the same coin. This should not be taken to 
imply that we as seasoned agents can only know what we genuinely intend to do or whether 
we genuinely intend to do what we seem to intend when we are confronted with the actual 
situation in which to act and are capable of perceiving it in a pragmatically appropriate way. 
Instead we can resort to simulation, imagine the situation and run a mental simulation of the 
action or, in cases of well-practiced actions, we may simply rely on our memory of past 
performances. The tentative proposal I have just sketched should not be taken to imply 
either that the having of a genuine intention is incompatible with the failure of the intended 
action. To say that an action can only be intentional if we have sufficient control over it is 
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 not the same as saying that it must be within our sole control. As Perry (1986)6 says, 
ultimately we must always leave it in part to the benevolence of Mother Nature whether or 
not an action succeeds.  
So to conclude, knowing that one genuinely intends to do something requires knowing that 
one knows how to do it. This knowledge is in turn perceptual or based on perception. To 
know that one knows how to act is to know that we capable of perceiving situations as 
pragmatically organized in a certain way. Thus, knowledge of our intentions is in part 
perceptual. There is indeed an asymmetry between first-person and third-person knowledge 
of intentions. To perceive someone else as having an intention it is not enough that one 
perceive the situation he is in as pragmatically organized in a certain way, one must also 
perceive his motor behavior as conforming to this organization. But the difference here is 
merely a difference in the amount of perceptual information needed. Surely, this is not 
enough to warrant skepticism as to the univocity of our concept of intention in its first-
person and third-person uses. 
 
                                                 
6 However, I disagree with Perry as to how much we must leave to the benevolence of Mother Nature. To my 
mind, Perry (1986) leaves to it much more than is strictly necessary. 
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